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Civil RICO, Protesters, and the First
Amendment: A Constitutional Combination
National Organization for Women v. Scheidler'
I. INTRODUCTION
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO")
provides for both government causes of action and a private cause of action.2
The private cause of action is usually referred to as civil RICO In recent
years, abortion clinics and other groups have used civil RICO in suits against
violent protesters.4 The circuits had disagreed, however, on whether RICO
requires the defendant to be economically motivated. Therefore, abortion
clinics and other potential plaintiffs were uncertain whether civil RICO was
a viable option in suits against politically or religiously motivated protesters.
In addition, many protest organizations have asserted that civil RICO
interferes with the First Amendment right to free expression.
In National Organization for Women v. Scheidler, the United States
Supreme Court held that RICO does not require a defendant to be
economically motivated.' Although the Court did not address the potential
First Amendment issues facing civil RICO,' this Note suggests that civil
RICO does not interfere with First Amendment protected expression.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On May 28, 1991, the National Organization for Women, Inc.
("NOW"), 8 the Delaware Women's Health Organization, Inc. ("DWHO"), and
the Summit Women's Health Organization, Inc. ("SWHO") 9 brought suit in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against a
1. National Org. for Womenv. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963-1964 (1988).
3. DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, TBE LAW OF CivL RICO § 1.1 (1991).
4. See, e.g., Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. MeMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.
1989).
5. See infra notes 56-94 and accompanying text.
6. National Org. for Women, 114 S. Ct. at 806.
7. Id. at 806 n.6.
8. NOW is a national nonprofit organization that supports women's rights,
including the legal availability of abortion. Id. at 801.
9. DWHO and SWHO "are health care centers that perform abortions and other
medical procedures." Id.
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coalition of antiabortion groups, including the Pro-Life Action Network
("PLAN"), Joseph Scheidler and other individuals and organizations that
oppose legal abortion, and a medical laboratory that formerly provided
services to DWHO and SWHO.10 The plaintiffs alleged violations of the
Sherman Act," the RICO Title of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970,12 and several state laws arising from the conduct of antiabortion
10. Id. The other respondents named in the complaint include: John Patrick
Ryan, RandallA. Terry, Andrew Scholberg, Conrad Wojnar, Timothy Murphy, Monica
Migliorino,Vital-MedLaboratories, Inc., Pro-Life Action League, Inc., Pro-Life Direct
Action League, Inc., Operation Rescue, and Project Life. Id. at 800 n.1.
11. Id.; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7. (1988).
12. National Org.for Women, 114 S. Ct. at 801; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988
and Supp. V 1993). The plaintiffs specifically alleged violations of §§ 1962(a), (c)
and (d). National Org.for Women, 114 S. Ct. at 801. Section 1962(a) provides in
part:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through
collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a
principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to
use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the
proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the
establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988). Section 1962(c) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct
of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or
collection of unlawful debt.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988). Section 1962(d) provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for
any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c)
of this section." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1988).
[Vol. 60
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protesters at the health care centers." The plaintiffs' civil RICO claims
sought injunctive relief, treble damages, costs, and attorneys' fees. 4
The plaintiffs alleged the defendants "were members of a nationwide
conspiracy to shut down abortion clinics through a pattern of racketeering
activity 5 including extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act." 6 The
plaintiffs claimed the defendants "conspired to use threatened or actual force,
violence, or fear to induce clinic employees, doctors, and patients to give up
their jobs, their economic right to practice medicine, and ... their right to
obtain medical services at the clinics."'" The plaintiffs claimed that this
conspiracyinjured their business and property interests in violation of RICO.'"
13. National Org. for Women, 114 S. Ct. at 801. The plaintiffs alleged the
defendants
threatened and intimidated clinic personnel andpatients, trespassed on clinic
property, invaded clinics and damaged clinic equipment, blocked ingress
and egress to clinics, destroyed clinic advertising, coordinated telephone
campaigns to tie up clinic lines, set up appointments under false pretenses
to keep legitimate patients from making appointments, and established
competing pregnancy testing and counseling facilities inthe vicinities of the
clinics.
National Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. 937, 938-39 (N.D. Ill. 1991),
affd, 968 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
14. National Org.for Women, 114 S. Ct. at 801.
15. Id.
16. Id. The Hobbs Act imposes fines and imprisonment on anybody who
interferes with commerce via threats or acts of violence. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1988).
Violation of the Hobbs Act requires proof "(1) that the defendant took or obtained
tangible or intangible property bywrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence,
or fear, and (2) that the defendant's conduct obstructed, delayed, or affected
commerce." ABRAMS, supra note 3, § 5.3.5. Violations of the Hobbs Act are
predicate acts under RICO. Id.
17. National Org. for Women, 114 S. Ct. at 801-02. The plaintiffs alleged that
the defendants engaged in the following activities in an attempt to shut down abortion
clinics:
extortion; physical and verbal intimidation and threats directed at health
center personnel and patients; trespass fipon and damage to center property;
blockades of centers; destruction of center advertising; telephone campaigns
designed to tie up center phone lines; false appointments to prevent
legitimate patients from making them; and direct interference with centers'
business relationships with landlords, patients, personnel, and medical
laboratories.
National Org. for Womenv. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612, 615 (7th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114
S. Ct. 798 (1994).
18. National Org.for Women, 114 S. Ct. at 802. RICO requires that the plaintiff
show injury to its business or property. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988); Sedima, S.P.R.L.
1995]
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The district court dismissed the RICO claim brought under section
1962(a),19 holding that voluntary donations received by the defendants did
not constitute income derived from racketeering activities for purposes of
section 1962(a).2" The court also dismissed the RICO claim brought under
section 1962(c), holding that RICO requires an economic motive "to the extent
that some profit-generating purpose must be alleged in order to state a RICO
claim."21 The court held that the plaintiffs failed to allege such a profit-
generating purpose.22 In addition, since the court dismissed the other RICO
claims, the court dismissed the RICO conspiracy claim brought under section
1962(d).23
The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit.24 The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the plaintiffs'
claims.' The court held that RICO requires allegation and proof of either
an economically motivated enterprise or economically motivated predicate
acts.26
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari "to resolve a conflict
among the courts of appeals on the putative economic motive requirement of
[RICO] § 1962(c) and (d)."' 7 The Supreme Court held that RICO does not
contain an economic motive requirement.2 ' Therefore, the plaintiffs could
v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985).
19. National Org. for Women, 765 F. Supp. at 945. The district court also
dismissedthe claim brought under the Sherman Act, holding that the Sherman Act did
not apply to the defendants' alleged activities. Id. at 914. The court held that since
the activities alleged "involve[d] political opponents, not commercial competitors, and
political objectives, not marketplace goals" the Sherman Act did not apply. Id.
20. Id. RICO § 1962(a) requires that the defendant acquire assets (income) from
specified unlawful activities and then use or invest such assets in an otherwise
legitimate enterprise. ABRAMS, supra note 3, §§ 4.5.2-.3.
21. National Org. for Women, 765 F. Supp. at 943.
22. Id. at 944.
23. Id.
24. National Org.for Women, 968 F.2d at 612.
25. Id. at 614.
26. Id. The court also held that the Sherman Act did not apply to the defendants'
activities. Id.
27. National Org.for Women, 114 S. Ct. at 802 (comparing United States v. Ivic,
700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1983), and United States v. Flynn, 852 F.2d 1045, 1052 (8th
Cir.) ("For purposes of RICO, an enterprise must be directed toward an economic
goal"), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 974 (1988), with Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v.
MoMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.) (because the predicate offense does not require
economic motive, RICO requires no additional economic motive), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 901 (1989)).
28. National Org.for Women, 114 S. Ct. at 806. Neither the enterprise nor the
[Vol. 60
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maintain the action if the defendants "conducted the enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity."
In a concurring opinion, Justice Souter explained that the First
Amendment does not require that RICO contain an economic motive
element." In addition, Justice Souter stressed that "the Court's opinion does





Congress enacted RICO as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970.32 The purpose of RICO was to "seek the eradication of organized
crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence
gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing
enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of
those engaged in organized crime."" Instead of defining the term "organized
crime," Congress focused on the type of activities engaged in by organized
crime 34 -particularly mail fraud, wire fraud, and securities fraud.35
Therefore, RICO is not limited to the stereotypical mobster or organized crime
figure. 6 In fact, as the United States Supreme Court held in Sedima
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., RICO potentially applies to "any person."37
predicate acts need be economically motivated. Id.
29. Id. The Court did not decide whether the defendants' alleged activities
amounted to a RICO violation. Id. The Court held only that the plaintiffs could
maintain the action since RICO does not require an economic motive. Id.
30. Id. (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy joined in the concurrence. Id.
31. Id.
32. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.).
33. Id.
34. John L. Koening, Comment, What Have They Done to Civil RICO: The
Supreme Court Takes the RacketeeringRequirement Out of Racketeering, 35 AM. U.
L. REV. 821, 830-31 (1986).
35. ABRAMS, supra note 3, § 1.1.
36. Koening, supra note 34, at 831.
37. Sedima, S.P.R.L., 473 U.S. at 495. The majority of civil RICO claims are
against businesseswith no ties to organized crime. Id. at 526 (Powell, J., dissenting).
1995]
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RICO provides both criminal penalties 8 and civil remedies39 for the
commission of four types of prohibited activities." The prohibited activities
are: (1) investing income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity in
the acquisition, establishment or operation of any enterprise engaged in
interstate commerce;41 (2) acquiring or maintaining any interest in an
interstate enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity;42 (3)
participating in the conduct of an interstate enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity;43 and (4) conspiring to violate any of the above
provisions.44
The term "enterprise" is defined by RICO as a "legal entity" or an
"associat[ion] in fact."4 A legal entity may be a private entity or a public
entity.46 An association in fact may be any combination of individuals or
entities. 7 As the Supreme Court held in United States v. Turkette,48 the
term "enterprise" encompasses both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises.4 9
The definition of "racketeering activity" includes numerous state and
federal crimes,"0 commonly referred to as 'predicate acts' or 'predicate
offenses.' 1 A "pattern of racketeering activity" is defined as at least two
predicate acts of racketeering activity within a ten year period. 2 The
predicate acts most frequently used to establish a pattern of racketeering
activity in civil RICO actions are: "[1] acts or threats chargeable under
generically described state criminal laws; [2] acts indictable under the mail
38. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988).
39. Id. § 1964.
40. Id. § 1962.
41. Id. § 1962(a).
42. Id. § 1962(b).
43. Id. § 1962(c).
44. Id. § 1962(d).
45. Id. § 1961(4).
46. ABRAMS, supra note 3, § 1.3.2.
47. ABRAMS, supra note 3, § 1.3.2. An enterprise and a defendant can be the
same person, except under § 1962(c). Id.
48. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
49. Id. at 580-81. The Court based its decision on the absence of statutory
language limiting the term to legitimate enterprises. Id. at 580.
50. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (Supp. V 1993). "Racketeering activity" includes such
crimes as murder, kidnapping; robbery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, wire
fraud, mail fraud, securities fraud, embezzlement, bribery, obstruction of justice and
numerous other state and federal crimes. Id.
51. Anne Melley, The Stretching of Civil RICO: Pro-Life Demonstrators Are
Racketeers?,56 UMKC L. REv. 287, 289 (1988).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988).
[Vol. 60
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fraud or wire fraud statutes; [3] offenses involving fraud in the sale of
securities; [4] and acts indictable under the Hobbs Act.'"53
RICO provides that "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by
reason of a violation of [RICO] may sue" under the civil remedies section of
the statute.54 The most widely invoked civil remedy is in section 1962(c),
which provides for the recovery of treble damages, costs, and reasonable
attorney's fees."
B. Economic Motive Requirement
In recent years, abortion clinics and other groups have begun to use civil
RICO as a new line of defense against violent protesters.56 The circuits had
disagreed, however, on whether RICO requires that either the racketeering
enterprise or the predicate acts of racketeering be economically motivated.57
Since protesters are usually motivated by religious or political beliefs instead
of economic goals, courts finding an economic motive requirement in RICO
have not allowed RICO actions against such protesters.
In United States v. Ivic,5" the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that RICO section 1962(c) requires either the enterprise or the predicate
acts to be economically motivated.59 In Ivic, the defendants were Croatian
Nationalists dedicated to liberating Croatia from Yugoslavia." The
defendants had committed several unlawful acts in order to further their
political cause, including the predicate acts of arson and attempted murder.6'
In addition to other counts, the district court convicted the Croatians under
53. See ABRAMS, supra note 3, § 5.3.
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988). Injury can be based on intangible property rights
as well as tangible property rights. Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. MeMonagle, 868
F.2d 1342, 1350 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989). For example, the right
to continue to operate a business is an intangible property right. Id.
55. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988). Other civil remedies include possible injunctive
relief under § 1962(b). 18 U.S.C. §§ 1964(a), (b) (1988). Although a small number
of courts have held that injunctive relief is available under civil RICO, the majority
of courts that have addressed the issue of injunctive relief have concluded that
injunctive relief is not available under civil RICO. See ABRAMS, supra note 3, § 3.4.3.
56. Adam D. Gale, Note, The Use ofCivilRICO Against Antiabortion Protesters
and the Economic Motive Requirement, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 1341, 1341 (1990).
57. National Organization for Women, 114 S. Ct. at 802.
58. 700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1983).
59. Id. at 65.
60. Id. at 53.
61. Id. at 59.
1995]
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criminal RICO section 1962(d) for conspiring to violate section 1962(c).62
However, the Second Circuit dismissed the RICO count on appeal since the
defendants' political motives were not accompanied by a financial motive.63
The Second Circuit based its finding of an economic motive requirement
in RICO on the statutory maxim that "[w]hen the same word is used in the
same section of an act more than once, and the meaning is clear in one place,
it will be assumed to have the same meaning in other places."" The court
explained the term enterprise in sections 1962(a) and (b) refers to an entity in
which funds can be invested and a property interest acquired." In other
words, an entity that is economically motivated.66 Therefore, the court
reasoned the term enterprise must have the same meaning in section
1962(c). 67
The Second Circuit supported its conclusion by citing statements made
by Senator McClellan, the principal sponsor of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970." The court explained Senator McClellan had clearly stated the
Act was to apply only to crimes which are adapted to commercial
exploitation.69 In addition, the court examined the RICO Guidelines issued
by the Justice Department." The court observed that these guidelines
expressly state that the enterprise must be directed "toward an economic
goal."' Thus, the Second Circuit held that RICO has an economic motive
requirement.
72
A few months later in United States v. Bagaric,3 the Second Circuit
once again addressed the issue of RICO and the economic motive
requirement.74 While upholding its decision in Ivic, the court emphasized the
economic motive could be part of either the enterprise itself or the predicate
acts.' In Bagaric, the defendants were Croatian terrorists who had
committed predicate acts of extortion to obtain money to further their terrorist
62. United States v. Cale, 508 F. Supp. 1038, 1043 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'dsub
nom. United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1983).
63. Ivic, 700 F.2d at 63.
64. Id.; Gale, supra note 56, at 1348.
65. Ivic, 700 F.2d at 60.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 63.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 64.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 65.
73. 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983).
74. Id. at 53.
75. Id. at 56.
[Vol. 60
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activities.76  Since the defendants' predicate acts were economically
motivated, the Second Circuit affirmed their RICO convictions.7
In an earlier case, United States v. Anderson,8 the Eighth Circuit also
held the enterprise must be economically motivated. 9 The court stated the
term enterprise encompasses only an association "which exists for the purpose
of maintaining operations directed toward an economic goal.""° Eight years
later in United States v. Flynn,81 the Eighth Circuit reaffirmed Anderson,
holding that "[flor purposes of RICO, an enterprise must be directed toward
an economic goal."'  In both decisions, however, the Eighth Circuit failed
to give an explanation for its holding."
In contrast to the Second and Eighth Circuits, the Third Circuit upheld
a civil RICO verdict even though the defendants lacked an economic
motive.' In Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle,s5 an abortion
clinic won a civil RICO suit against a group of antiabortion protesters.8 6 The
protesters had committed acts of extortion in an attempt to force the clinic out
of business.' Extortion is a crime under the Hobbs Act," and any
violation of the Hobbs Act is a predicate offense under RICO. 9 On appeal,
the protesters argued that extortion must be accompanied by an economic
motive, and that their motive was purely political.9" In rejecting the
argument, the Third Circuit stated "that lack of economic motive does not
constitute a defense to Hobbs Act crimes."91 The court reasoned that since
76. Id. at 58.
77. Id. at 46.
78. 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980).
79. Id. at 1372.
80. Id.
81. 852 F.2d 1045 (8th Cir. 1988).
82. Id. at 1052.
83. Gale, supra note 56, at 1353.
84. Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc., v. MoMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989).
85. Id. See generally Jo Anne Pool, Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v.
McMonagle: A Message to Political Activists, 23 AKRON L. REv. 251 (1989).
86. Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc., 868 F.2d at 1342.
87. Id. at 1350.
88. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988).
89. Id. § 1961(1)(B); ABRAMS, supra note 3, § 5.3.5. See discussion at text
accompanying supra note 53.
90. Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc., 868 F.2d at 1349.
91. Id. at 1350.
1995]
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the predicate acts of extortion did not require an economic motive, the RICO
claim did not require an economic motive.'
With the conflict among the circuits concerning RICO and the economic
motive requirement,' abortion clinics and other potential plaintiffs were
uncertain whether civil RICO was a viable claim in lawsuits against politically
or religiously motivated protesters who were otherwise lacking an economic
motive. In National Organization for Women v. Scheidler," the United
States Supreme Court resolved both the conflict and the uncertainty.
C. RICO and the First Amendment
As the frequency of civil RICO suits and criminal prosecutions increased,
some defendants began to challenge the RICO statute on First Amendment
grounds.95 Protest organizations and other defendants involved in RICO
actions have asserted that RICO is unconstitutional both on its face and in its
application." However, the few courts addressing the issue have not
agreed.'
92. Id.
93. Other circuits had commented on the economic motive requirement without
expressly deciding on it. See Gale, supra note 56, at 1356-57 (citing e.g., United
States v. Thordarson, 646 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1055 (1981);
United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170
(1983); United States v. Webster, 669 F.2d 185 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 935
(1982)).
94. 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
95. See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993); Northeast
Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir. 1989); Town of West
Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 371 (D. Conn. 1989), vacated, 915 F.2d
92 (2d Cir. 1990).
96. See infra text accompanying notes 98-127. In the context of the First
Amendment, a litigant may challenge a statute on grounds that it is unconstitutional
as applied, or unconstitutional on its face. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521
(1972). A statute is unconstitutional as applied if it impermissibly punishes the
defendant's freedom of expression. A statute is unconstitutional on its face if it is
overbroad or vague. Id.; Connallyv. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
A statute is overbroad if, in addition to punishing unprotected expression, it has
potential to punish protected expression. Gooding, 405 U.S. at 522. A statute is vague
if persons "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application." Connally, 269 U.S. at 391. The reason for striking down a
statute for being overbroad or vague is that such a statute may chill the free expression
of third parties who are not willing to risk punishment. Russell W. Galloway, Basic
Free Speech Analysis, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 883, 899 (1991).
97. Galloway, supra note 96, at 899.
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss1/11
CIVIL RICO
In McMonagle, the Third Circuit rejected a First Amendment challenge
to a civil RICO verdict.9" The defendants were antiabortion protesters who
used force and violence in an effort to force an abortion clinic out of
business.99  They argued that because they were exercising political
expression protected by the First Amendment, it was unconstitutional to apply
civil RICO to their activities.' The Third Circuit rejected the argument
and affirmed the RICO verdict against the defendants. 11  The court
explained that the defendants had not expressed their political opinion in a
"manner protected under the First Amendment."10 2 The Third Circuit noted
that, while the First Amendment protects the defendants' right to attempt to
persuade the clinic to stop performing abortions, the First Amendment does
not offer a sanctuary for defendants who violate the law." 3 The defendants
in this case crossed a line separating acts of protected expression from acts of
unprotected unlawful conduct.'0 4
The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut in Town
of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue 5 also rejected a First Amendment
argument in a civil RICO action." 6 The defendants trespassed on the land
of the Summit Women's Center while engaging in an antiabortion protest."7
The defendants also blocked access to exits and entrances, and remained on
the premises after being instructed to leave.' The plaintiffs requested
damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief pursuant to RICO.109 In
98. Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc., 868 F.2d at 1349.
99. Id. at 1350. The defendants trespassedon and destroyed the clinic's property,
harassed clients and employees, and engaged in blockades. Id. at 1347. The7
defendants were found to have violated the Hobbs Act, a predicate offense under
RICO. Id. at 1348.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1357.
102. Id. at 1348.
103. Id. at 1349.
104. Id.
105. 726 F. Supp. 371 (D. Conn. 1989), vacated, 915 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1990).
The Town of West Hartford filed RICO claims against Operation Rescue, and the
Summit Women's Center subsequently intervened, asserting its own RICO claims
against Operation Rescue. Id. at 105. On review, the appellate court dismissed the
town's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and did not consider the
sufficiency of the center's claims. Id.
106. Town of WestHartford, 726 F. Supp. at 371.
107. Id. at 373.
108. Id.
109. Id. The plaintiffs also filed several pendent state law claims. Id. The court
concluded that injunctive relief was not available under civil RICO § 1964(c). Id. at
378. However, the court issued an injunction pursuant to state law. Id. at 383.
1995]
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response, the defendants argued an injunction would have a chilling effect on
First Amendment expression."'
The court ruled that the "defendants have no [F]irst [A]mendment right
to carry on even pure speech activities on private property and against the
wishes of the Center and its landlord.""' The court noted that coercive or
offensive expression is protected as long as the speaker refrains from violence
and the threat of violence."' The court emphasized, however, that a "bright
line is crossed at the threshold of private property. [W]illful trespass[ ] is not
protected conduct no matter what its purpose.""'
The United States Supreme Court addressed similar constitutional
arguments in Alexander v. United States."' In Alexander, prosecutors used
predicate acts of obscenity"5 as a basis for charging the defendant with
criminal RICO violations." 6 Pursuant to RICO, the defendant was ordered
to forfeit his obscene materials."' The defendant contended that the RICO
forfeiture order amounted to an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech
because it prohibits future protected expression in retaliation for previous
obscenity violations."'
The Court explained, however, that a prior restraint is an order that
forbids a person from engaging in expressive activity in the future."9 The
Court stated there is a "time-honored distinction between barring speech in the
future and penalizing past speech."2 In this case, the RICO forfeiture order
110. Id. at 382.
111. Id. at 383 (citing Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Cologne v.
Westfarms Assoc., 469 A.2d 1201 (Conn. 1984); cf Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474
(1988)).
112. Id. (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 911, 916
(1982); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 407-08 (1989)).
113. Id. (citing Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 670 F. Supp. 1300,
1308 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Portland Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Advocates for Life,
859 F.2d 681, 686 (9th Cir. 1988); Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 920)).
114. 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993).
115. The defendant was in the "adult entertainment" business in which he sold
pornographic magazines, videotapes, and sexual paraphernalia. Id. at 2769. At trial,
the jury found that four magazines and three videotapes distributed by the defendant
were obscene. Id. He was subsequently convicted of seventeen obscenity offenses and
three RICO offenses. Id. The RICO offenses were predicated on the obscenity
convictions. Id. at 2769-70.
116. Id. at 2769. Although this Note is limited to the discussion of civil RICO,
the First Amendment arguments in Alexander are analogous.
117. Id. at 2770.
118. Id. at 2770-71.
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served as a penalty for past criminal conduct, 21 and did not bar the
defendant from engaging in future protected speech.122
The defendant in Alexander also argued that the forfeiture penalties
imposed under RICO "have an improper 'chilling' effect on free expression
by deterring others from engaging in protected speech. . . ."" The Court
acknowledged that some self-censorship might occur." Even so, the Court
explained that deterrence of the predicate act of obscenity is a legitimate
end," and that the imposed penalty is clearly constitutional. 26
In National Organization for Women, the United States Supreme Court
did not address the potential First Amendment issues facing civil RICO.1'
Justice Souter suggested, however, that First Amendment issues will
undoubtedly arise in future civil RICO actions."2
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, began by considering
the issue of RICO section 1962(c) and the economic motive requirement. 129
After examining the RICO statute, the majority explained that neither section
1962(c) nor the definitions in section 1961 refer to an economic motive." °
In addition, the majority rejected the Seventh Circuit's reasoning that the term
enterprise, as used in sections 1962(a) and (b), restricts the scope of the term
enterprise in section 1962(c)."' The majority explained that an enterprise
121. Id.
122. Id. In addition, the defendant asserted that the RICO statute is overbroad.
Id. at 2774. The Court dismissedthe argument explaining that the "RICO statute does




126. Id. See also Fort Wayne Books v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46 (1989).
127. National Org.for Women, 114 S. Ct. at 798.
128. Id. at 807.
129. Id. at 802. The majority first considered the issue of standing, explaining
that, in order to have standing, the plaintiff must allege injury resulting from the
defendant's conduct. Id. at 803. In the instant case, DWHO and SWHO alleged the
defendants' activities injured their business and property interests. Id. Therefore, the
majority held that DWHO and SWHO had standing to bring the RICO claim. Id.
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in subsections (a) and (b) is not required to be a profit-seeking entity.1 12
The subsections merely require that the enterprise be an entity acquired either
through illegal activity or through money obtained from illegal activity. 3 '
Even so, the enterprise in subsection (c) is "the vehicle through which the
unlawful pattern of racketeering activity is committed," rather than an entity
that is being acquired.' Therefore, since an entity is not being acquired,
the majority concluded that the enterprise in subsection (c) is not required to
have an economic motive for engaging in illegal activity."3 5
The majority next examined the reasoning of the Second Circuit in
United States v. Bagaric.16  In Bagaric, the Second Circuit based its
analysis in part on a statement found in RICO's congressional findings.3 7
The statement suggests that RICO was enacted to eradicate activities that
"'drain[ ] billions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct
and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption."" 3 The Second Circuit
decided that, in order to "drain[ ] billions of dollars," such activities must be
economically motivated.3 9
Justice Rehnquist rejected the Second Circuit's reasoning. 4 ' He
explained that some activities, such as extortion, may not be economically
motivated, yet still may drain money from the economy. 4' Extortion, for
example, may force an otherwise successful business to close down. Justice
Rehnquist explained that the congressional statement was a rather "thin reed"
upon which to base an economic motive requirement, particularly because the
statute does not expressly or impliedly require one.
1 12
Referring to the Court's decision in United States v. Turkette,'43 the
majority next examined the definition of enterprise in RICO section




135. Id. In addition, the enterprise in § 1962(c), does not need to have an
acquirable property interest. Id.
136. Id. at 805. See supra notes 73-77.
137. Id.
138. United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 57 n.13 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting
Organized Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970)).




143. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
144. National Org. for Women, 114 S. Ct. at 804.
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legitimate enterprises,'45 Turkelte concluded that the definition of enterprise
in section 1961(4) encompasses both legitimate and illegitimate
enterprises. 4 The Court explained that Congress could easily have limited
the scope of the term, but chose not to.'47 Comparing Turkette with
National Organization for Women, the majority noted that nothing in the
statutory language requires an enterprise under section 1962(c) to have an
economic motive. 4 As in section 1961(4), Congress could easily have
limited the scope of the term enterprise, but choose not to. 149
Next the majority reviewed the 1981 RICO Guidelines issued by the
Justice Department, which the Seventh Circuit found persuasive in reaching
its holding. 5 The 1981 Guidelines provided that an association-in-fact
enterprise must be "directed toward an economic goal."'' Justice Rehnquist
noted, however, that the Justice Department amended the Guidelines in
1984.152 The new Guidelines provide that an association-in-fact enterprise
may be directed toward "other identifiable goal[s]."'53
Finally, the majority disposed of the defendants' arguments concerning
RICO's legislative history.' The majority explained that the statutory
language is unambiguous,'55 and that nothing in the legislative history
warrants a different construction.1
6
Therefore, the majority held that RICO does not contain an economic
motive requirement.'57 As a result, the plaintiffs could maintain the action
by demonstrating that the defendants "conducted the enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity."'58
145. Id. (citing Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580).
146. National Org. for Women, 114 S. Ct. at 805 (citing Turkette, 452 U.S. at
580-81).







154. Id. at 806.
155. Id.
156. Id. The majority also rejected the defendants' argument that the rule of
lenity should apply. Id. The rule of lenity is a maxim of statutory construction that
construes an ambiguous criminal statute in favor of the accused. Staples v. United
States, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1804 n.17 (1994). The rule only applies if a statute contains
an ambiguity. National Org. for Women, 114 S. Ct. at 806.
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B. Concurring Opinion
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Kennedy, concurred with the majority's
opinion, but wrote separately to "explain why the First Amendment does not
require reading an economic-motive requirement into" RICO." 9 In addition,
Justice Souter stressed that "the Court's opinion does not bar First Amendment
challenges to RICO's application in particular cases."6
Justice Souter directly addressed the defendants' argument that the First
Amendment issues which could arise from applying RICO to protest
organizations should be avoided by construing an economic motive
requirement into the statute.' On occasion, when a statute is ambiguous,
the Court narrowly construes the statute to avoid constitutional problems.162
Justice Souter explained, however, that RICO is unambiguous, and therefore
that this principle of statutory construction does not apply. 63
Even assuming the principle of construction does apply, Justice Souter
noted that an economic motive requirement would correspond poorly to First
Amendment concerns.' Such a requirement would be both overprotective
and underprotective."5 Ideological entities that engaged in acts of violence
would escape the grasp of the RICO statute.'66 At the same time,
economically motivated entities that engaged in acts of protected expression
could be exposed to harassing RICO suits.'67
Finally, Justice Souter explained that an economic motive requirement is
unnecessarybecause legitimate free speech claims may be raised by defendants
in future RICO cases.'68 For example, conduct alleged to be a RICO
predicate act may actually be activity protected by the First Amendment. 69
Furthermore, even if a RICO violation is established, "the First Amendment
may limit the relief that can be granted against an organization otherwise
engaging in protected expression."'70




163. Id. at 806-07 (Souter, J., concurring).






170. Id. Justice Souter noted the following cases where the First Amendment
limited the available relief: NAACP v. Claibome Hardware, Co., 458 U.S. 886, 917
(1982); NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) ; Oregon Natural
[Vol. 60
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In conclusion, Justice Souter noted RICO's potential to deter free speech,





In light of the Court's decision in National Organization for Women,
antiabortion advocates and other protest organizations may no longer escape
the net of civil RICO merely by claiming a non-economic agenda. Civil
RICO now applies to groups that are politically or religiously motivated, as
well as those that are economically motivated.172 For purposes of RICO, the
question is whether the group violated the law, not whether they violated the
law for financial reward. 3
Many protest organizations and commentators agree with Justice Souter
that the use of RICO against protesters raises significant First Amendment
issues. 74  Some have argued that civil RICO punishes acts of free
expression protected by the Constitution. 75 However, this author believes
that civil RICO does not punish acts of free expression and does not otherwise
interfere with First Amendment rights.
Civil RICO is likely to be constitutional when applied to protest
organizations because it does not punish protected acts of expression.
Peaceful picketing, protesting, and other non-violent acts of expression
protected under the First Amendment are not predicate acts under RICO, and
will not subject individuals to RICO liability.176 RICO punishes only
unlawful conduct such as murder, arson, robbery, extortion, and fraud. 177
As the court in Town of West Har4ford explained, such violent and unlawful
conduct has never received First Amendment protection. 7
Furthermore, civil RICO imposes. liability only on conduct already a
crime under state or federal law.'79 Therefore, if the conduct is beyond First
Amendment protection when charged as a crime under state or federal law, it
is likewise beyond First Amendment protection when it is the subject of a
Resources Council v. Mohla, 944 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1991).
171. National Org. for Women, 114 S. Ct. at 807 (Souter, J., concurring).
172. Criminal RICO also applies, but is beyond the scope of this Note.
173. National Org. for Women, 114 S. Ct. at 806.
174. See infra notes 183-93 and accompanying text.
175. See infra notes 183-93 and accompanying text.
176. National Org.for Women, 968 F.2d at 616.
177. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (Supp. V 1993).
178. Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 371, 383 (D.
Conn. 1989), vacated, 915 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1990).
179. Gale, supra note 56, at 1371-72.
1995]
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civil RICO suit.8 ° The unlawful conduct does not acquire First Amendment
protection solely because the action is filed under RICO."'
One commentator has described civil RICO as an unreasonable limitation
on protest activity." That description, however, is inaccurate. Civil RICO
meets all the requirements of areasonabletime, place, and mannerrestriction. "
Since RICO is directed at restricting the manner in which protest activities are
conducted, rather than the communicative message of the activities, it is a
content-neutral restriction."M In addition, civil RICO satisfies mid-level
judicial review since it is narrowly tailored to "serve a significant government
interest," and since it "leave[s] open ample alternative channels" for the
communication of the protesters' message."' 5 For example, the government
has a significant interest in restricting unlawful conduct such as murder,
robbery, extortion, and other RICO predicate acts."8 6 Additionally, RICO
is narrowly tailored to restrict unlawful conduct since, by its own terms, it is
limited in applicationto specific crimes. Furthermore, peaceful demonstrating,
picketing, leafletting, and other non-violent acts of expression provide "ample
alternative channels" for the communication of the protesters' message." 7
The ACLU has expressed concern that civil RICO has enormous potential
for chilling First Amendment rights of free expression." For example, the
threat of a civil RICO suit may deter peaceful protesters from engaging in acts
of protected expression."8 9 Although the ACLU's concern is legitimate, it
exaggerates the threat of a civil RICO suit. Since civil RICO applies only
when protesters commit specific unlawful acts, it is doubtful that protesters
180. See generally Gale, supra note 56, at 1371-72. The same would hold true
for criminal RICO.
181. Gale, supra note 56, at 1371-72.
182. John P. Barry, When Protesters Become "Racketeers, "RICO Runs Afoul of
the First Amendment, 64 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 899, 914 (1990).
183. Content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions will satisfy mid-level
judicial review if they are narrowly tailored to "serve a significant governmental
interest" and "leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information." Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
184. A restriction is content-neutral if it is "unrelated to the suppression of free
expression." United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
185. See generally Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 (discussing
mid-level judicial review).
186. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (Supp. V 1993).
187. See generally Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc., 868 F.2d at 1353 (discussing
injunctive relief).
188. Rorie Sherman, Courts Deal Blockaders Big Setbacks,NAT'L L.J., Nov. 13,
1989, at 30. (quoting Antonio Califa, ACLU counsel).
189. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2774.
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will unknowingly or accidentally engage in a pattern of racketeering activity,
particularly if they make an effort to learn RICO's predicate acts prior to
engaging in expressive activity. Under these circumstances, protesters may
engage in acts of protected expression with little threat of civil liability.
The ACLU's concern also exaggerates the scope of civil RICO. Civil
RICO does not limit First Amendment expression. Protesters have the same
constitutional rights under civil RICO as they would if RICO did not exist.
Protesters may engage in peaceful protesting, picketing, leafletting,
demonstrating, and other similar acts of expression. 9' Protesters may not,
however, destroy property, murder, steal, extort property, kidnap individuals,
or commit certain other unlawful acts. It is important to note that if civil
RICO was repealed, all of the acts that represent RICO predicate acts would
remain beyond First Amendment protection."'
In addition, one commentator has noted that, because of the threat of
penalties, RICO represents a potential prior restraint on free expression."
A prior restraint is something that forbids a person from engaging in
expressive activity in the future."w There is a "time-honored distinction,"
however, between preventing future expression and penalizing past
expression.' As the Court in Alexander explained, RICO penalizes past
unlawful expression, but does not prevent protesters from engaging in future
expressive activity."5 The claim that penalties for past unlawful conduct act
as a prior restraint on future lawful conduct erodes this "time-honored
distinction," and results in a circular theory.
VI. CONCLUSION
By rejecting the economic motive requirement in National Organization
for Women, the United States Supreme Court has approved the use of civil
RICO against protesters and protest organizations. In light of the decision,
many protesters argue that civil RICO interferes with their First Amendment
190. See generally Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc., 868 F.2d at 1353 (discussing
injunctive relief).
191. Future civil RICO defendants may attempt to convince the courts that RICO
is overbroad and therefore unconstitutional on its face. However, as the Supreme
Court explained in Alexander, RICO is not overbroad since it does not punish
constitutionally protected speech. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2774. Furthermore, even
if RICO was found to be overbroad, it could not be struck down unless its overbreadth
was substantial. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
192. Barry, supra note 182, at 915.
193. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2771.
194. Id. at 2773.
195. Id. at 2772.
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right to free expression. However, as this Note suggests, civil RICO imposes
liability only on unprotected acts of unlawful conduct and does not interfere
with, or limit, acts of protected expression.
TIMOTHY S. MILLMAN
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